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RECENT THEORIES 
OF THE 
CAPITALIST STATE
Bob Jessop
Despite their very different assumptions 
and principles o f explanation, monetarists, 
Keynesians and Marxists share a concern 
with the nature and im pact o f state 
intervention in capitalist economies. Yet, in 
contrast to the study of market forces, the 
state itself is strangely neglected as a field of 
analysis. This is as true o f theories that 
presuppose an active role for the state as of 
those that entail a more limited ro)e. Indeed, 
even though Marxists have long claimed 
sp ecia l k n ow led ge  o f  the stra teg ic  
significance of the state in class struggle, it is 
only in the last ten years that they have 
rediscovered the state as a problem in 
political economy. The resulting discussion 
has ranged from the most abstract 
methodological issues to quite specific 
historical problems and has generated a 
variety of hypotheses and insights. It is 
unfortunately true that much of the Marxist 
debate is esoteric and often inaccessible
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and/or irrelevant to those working in other 
traditions. But, in the absence of any 
comparable reappraisal of the state, this 
debate m erits w ider con s id era tion . 
Moreover, since Marxism has long been 
concerned with the state as well as with 
production and exchange, it is surely worth 
assessing to what extent an integrated 
approach can illuminate economic analysis. 
Such an enquiry is particularly germane in 
the current period of continuing world 
econom ic crisis and increasing state 
intervention to restructure the industrial and 
financial system.
It should be emphasised that the present 
survey is not concerned with M arxist 
economics as such, but focuses instead on 
some recent Marxist theories of the capitalist 
state. Nor does it develop a new approach; it 
simply considers these theories in terms of 
certain given criteria. These comprise 
general criteria such as logical consistency 
and theoretical determinacy, as well as more 
specific criteria relevant to an evaluation of 
Marxist theories. The latter can be stated 
quite briefly as followsJA Marxist theory of 
the capitalist state will be considered 
adequate to the extent that (a) it is founded
on the specific qualities of capitalism as a 
mode of production, (b) it attributes a central 
role to class struggle in the process of capital 
accumulation, (c) it establishes the relations 
between the political and economic features 
of society without reducing one to the other or 
treating them as totally independent and 
autonomous, (d.) it allows for historical and 
national differences in the forms and 
functions of the state in capitalist societies, 
and (e) it allows for the influence of non­
capitalist classes and non-class forces in 
determining the nature of the state and the 
exercise of state power. To justify the choice 
o f these particular criteria would side-track 
the discussion before it begins; it is hoped 
that their relevance and importance will 
emerge as we proceed.
The paper starts with a short review of the 
approach of Marx and other classical 
Marxist theorists to the capitalist state. 
Several different themes in their work are 
specified and their merits and demerits 
considered. This provides a framework 
within which to assess recent developments. 
Some variations on the themes of the 
classical texts are then examined and 
criticised for their failure to advance the 
Marxist theory of the state. This brings us to 
the central part of the paper, which deals 
with recent theories of the capitalist state, 
evaluated in the light of our criteria. The 
paper concludes with some general remarks 
on Marxist analyses of state power in 
capitalist societies and their implications for 
other theoretical approaches.
The classic texts on the state
It is commonplace that Marx did not offer a 
theoretical analysis of the capitalist state to 
match the scope and rigour of Das Kapital. 
His work on the state com prises a 
fragmented and unsystematic series of 
philosophical reflections, contemporary 
history, journalism and incidental remarks. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Marx 
rarely focuses directly on the complex 
relations between the state apparatus, state 
power, capital accumulation and its social 
preconditions. But it is less often remarked 
that the same is true of other classical 
Marxist theorists, such as Engels, Lenin, 
Trotsky and Gramsci. For, although they 
offer various acute observations on the state 
in general, specific historical cases, and the
nature of ideological domination, they do not 
confront the crucial question o f the 
differential forms of the capitalist state and 
their adequacy to continued accumulation in 
different situations. Indeed, in so far as the 
classic texts do focus on this issue, they do so 
in inconsistent ways. There are at least six 
different approaches, and, although they are 
often combined with varying degrees of 
consistency and mutual qualification, they 
involve different theoretical assumptions, 
principles of explanation and political 
im plications. They must therefore be 
considered separately before one can draw 
any general conclusions about the classical 
approach as a whole.
(i) Marx originally treated the modern 
state (at least that in 19th-century Prussia) 
as a parasitic institution that played no 
essential role in economic production or 
reproduction. In his view, democratic 
government would be characterised by a 
genuine unity of state and people, whereas 
the modern state was an expression of the 
irreconcilable conflicts rooted in the egoism 
of civil society. In this context, the state and 
its officials, far from representing the 
common interest, tend to exploit and oppress 
civil society on behalf of particular sectional 
groups. Indeed, Marx argues that, just as 
corporate organisation enables the 
bourgeoisie and master craftsmen to defend 
their material interests, the state becomes 
the private property o f officials in their 
struggle for self-advancement (Marx, 1970, 
especially pp. 44-54; see also Hunt, 1975, p. 
124). This view was elaborated in his critique 
of Hegel’s political theories, when the young 
Marx was still committed to liberal radical 
political ideas. Nor had he then developed 
the conception of capitalism as a mode of 
production and so could not identify the 
specific characterisitcs of the capitalist state 
(Althusser, 1969, pp. 49-86; 1976, pp. 151-161; 
Mandel, 1971, pp. 52-67 and passim). 
Thereafter, although he retained the basic 
ideas about the form  o f the modern 
representative state and its separation from 
civil society. Marx treated it as a necessary 
part of the system of class domination raffier 
than as extraneous and parasitic. The latter 
view can still be found in his subsequent 
work on Oriental despotism, however, where 
Marx sometimes treats the Asiatic mode of 
production as communal in nature and the 
Asiatic state as a parasitic body standing
above society (see particularly Marx, 1973, 
pp. 471-514 passim). But, although the idea 
that the modern state is essentially parasitic 
is still held in anarchist circles, it was not 
long retained by Marx himself.
(ii) Marx also discusses the state and state 
power as epiphenomena (i.e. simple surface 
reflections) of the system of property 
relations and the resulting economic class 
struggles. This view is again largely 
confined to the earlier writings, but it 
emerges occasionally in his later work and 
occurs frequently in more recent Marxist 
analyses. It is particularly clear in Marx’s 
early comments on law (in which legal 
relations are treated as mere expressions of 
the social relations of production), but is also 
apparent in more general analyses of 
political institutions. The most frequently 
cited illustration of this approach is the 1859 
Preface to his Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy. This appears to treat law 
and politics as a superstructure based on the 
economic infrastructure, to view property 
relations as the legal expression of relations 
of production, and to ground revolution on 
the growing contradiction between forces 
and relations of production. In general, this
approach considers the structure of the state 
as a surface reflection of a self-sufficient and 
self-developing economic base. And, since 
classes are defined in purely economic terms, 
the.ex£rcise of state power i s seen as a surface 
reflection of economic struggle. It also 
implies that there is a perfect, one-to-one 
correspondence between juridico-political 
relations and economic relations or, at best, 
some sort of ‘lead’ or ‘lag’ between them. It 
thus reduces the impact of the state to~a 
simple temporal deformation of economic 
"development (typically viewed in terms of 
the growth of the forces of production) and of 
economic class struggle (typically viewed in 
terms of a struggle over the distribution of 
the product). Thus, although state 
intervention can accelerate or hinder 
economic development, the latter is always
determinant in tEe__last__instance (see
particularly, Engels, 1954, pp. 253-254, and 
Marx and Engels, 1975, pp. 392-394).
(iii) Another common approach treats the 
state as the factor o f cohesion in a given 
society. This perspective is closely identified 
nowadays with Poulantzas. but is also 
evident in the classic texts. Thus Engels 
views the state as an institution that emerges
pari passu with economic exploitation. 
argues that its function is to regulate the 
struggle between antagonistic classes 
through renression and concession, and thus 
to m oderate  c la ss  c o n flic t  w ith o ut 
undarmininjr the continued domination of 
the ruling class and the reproduction of the 
dominant, mode of production (Engels, 1942, 
pp. 154-163 and passim). Lenin adopts the 
same view in several places (see especially 
Lenin, 1970, passim). Bukharin also treats 
society as a system of unstable equilibrium 
inside which the state acts as a ‘regulator’ 
and Gramsci, albeit from a far less 
mechanistic position, adopts more or less the 
same argument on several occasions 
(Bukharin, 1969, pp. 150-154 and passim; 
Gramsci, 1971, pp. 206-276). The principal 
difficulties with this approach are twofold. 
Firstly, it fails to specify the nature of the 
state as a factor of cohesion and/or to 
identify the means through which the state 
realises, this function. Hence the state is 
defined in functional terms and comes to 
include every institution which contributes 
to cohesion (see especially Poulantzas, 1973, 
pp. 44-50). It is impossible to elucidate the 
class nature of the state in this wav. Indeed, 
far from  lea d in g  to rev o lu tion a ry  
conclusions, it is this view that is most often 
associated with the idea that the state can
‘reconcile’..class conflict bv acting as a
neutral mediator. Secondly, unless one can 
specify the mechanism of cohesion and its 
limitations, it becomes difficult to explain 
the emergence of revolutionary crises and 
the transition from one epoch to another. In 
this respect, this sort of approach is so 
obviously inadequate that it must be 
complemented and supported with reference 
jto other perspectives.
(iv) The state is also seen as an mstrume.nt 
nf rlaftfi rule. This is the most common 
approach and is particularly evident in 
exegeses o f  M arx ism -L en in ism . A 
fundamental problem is the tendency to 
assume that the state as an instrument is 
neutral and can be used with equal facility 
and equal effectiveness by any class or social 
force. This approach also encounters 
difficulties in situations where the 
economically dominant class does not 
actually fill the key positions in the state 
apparatus (as cited by Marx himself in the 
case of the landed aristocracy ruling on 
behalf o f capital in 19th-century Britain).
The same problem occurs where the state 
acquires a considerable measure of 
independence from the dominant class 
owing to a more or less temporary 
equilibrium in the class struggle. This 
situation is alleged to have occurred in the 
absolutist state, the Second French Empire 
under Louis Bonaparte, and the German 
Reich under Bismarck. In neither case can 
one explain how the state remains an 
instrument of class rule even though the 
dominant class has no immediate control 
over it. Similar problems occur in the study of 
‘dual power’ in revolutionary situations and 
in the analysis of transitions between 
different modes of production.
(v) A further approach in the classic 
Marxist texts is similar to that of orthodox 
in stitu tion a l stu d ies in so c io lo g y , 
anthropology and political science. The state 
is treated as a set o f institutions and no 
general assumptions are made about its 
class character. The state is seen as a ‘public 
power’ that develops at a certain stage in the 
division of labour (usually identified with the 
emergence of a mode of productionbased on 
the exploitation of one class by another) and 
that involves the emergence of a distinct 
system of government which is monopolised 
by officials who specialise in administration 
and/or repression. This theme is evident in 
Engels (1942) and Lenin (1970). It can 
accommodate the objections to the 
approaches reviewed above and yet leaves 
open the question of their adequacy in 
specific situations. It implies that the 
functions, effects and class nature of the 
state cannot be determined a priori, but 
depend on the relations betw een,!ts  
institutional structure and the class struggle 
in various circumstances. In the absence of 
such conjunctural analyses, however, the 
institutional approach can establish the 
nature of the state only through a return to 
more primitive formulations. Thus it tends to 
be associated with epiphenomenalism (the 
institutions now mirror the economic base) 
and/or instrumentalism (the institutions are 
controlled by capital). Moreover, even when 
it is associated with concrete analyses, the 
institutional approach may simply lead to 
descriptive accounts without any nttemnt to 
explain what occurs.
(vi) It is in this context that the sixth 
approach is especially relevant. It examines
the state as a system, nfnnU.tic.al domination 
with specific effects on the class struggle. 
Thus, whereas the instrumentalist approach 
focuses on the question of ‘who rules’, this
approach shifts attention to the forms of
p o lit ica l rep resen ta tion  and sta te
intervention. It examines them as more or
less adequate to securing a balance of class 
forces that is favourable to the long-term 
interests of a given class or class fraction. It 
is illustrated in Lenin’s remark that a 
democratic republic is the best possible shell 
for capitalism and that, once this form of 
state is established, no change of persons. 
in s.til.ul.iQ.n s nr parties can shaket.hepolitical 
rule -of., capital (Lenin, 1970, p. 296; see also 
Marx and Engels, 1975, p. 350). And it is 
central to the discussions of the Paris 
Commune as the model for working-class 
political domination (see particularly Marx, 
1974, passim, and Lenin, 1970, passim). This 
approach is most fruitful when used in 
conjunction with an institutional definition 
of -the state. For, although it avoids the 
difficulties associated with the other 
approaches reviewed above, it still needs to 
be developed and supported by a concrete 
analysis of institutions. Otherwise it tends to 
become a sophisticated attempt to establish 
theoretical guarantees that the state in a 
capitalist society necessarily functions on 
behalf of capital. Thus, in opposition to those 
who argue that the internal organisation of 
the state can ensure that it functions to 
reproduce capital (e.g. Offe, 1974, passim), it 
is vital to insist tha t pr>'«OT- pan Vip m ore  
or less capitalist depending on th e  situation
• So nowhere in the Marxist classics do we 
find a well formulated, coherent and 
sustained theoretical analysis of the state. 
This is not to deny that they offer a series of 
acute historical generalisations and political 
insights nor, indeed, that they lay the 
foundations for a more rigorous analysis. In 
particular, the perspective of political 
domination (the sixth approach) provides an 
adequate starting point for studying the 
state and state power. But much of the 
renewed discussion still reflects the 
limitations of the other approaches and fails 
to develop this insight into the nature of 
political domination. This is apparent in 
various ways. Although the state is rarely 
t r e a t e d  n o w a d a y s  a s  a s im p le  
epiphenomenon with no real influence, its 
forms and effects are often explained solely
in terms of the ‘needs’ of the economy. 
Alternatively, the state may be connected to 
the economy only as an instrument in the 
class struggle. Both approaches can be found 
in association with different views about the 
economic base. Moreover, some recent work 
concentrates largely on the political struggle 
between capital and labour and is therefore 
relevant to economic questions only to the 
extent that they are influenced by political 
factors. This is not to argue that these 
various economic and political approaches 
are incorrect, but simply to suggest that one 
should appreciate their limitations as well as 
their contributions to the theory of the state. 
Both facets can be illustrated by considering 
the early work o f Miliband and Poulantzas, 
the views of the so-called neo-Ricardian 
theorists, and the study of ‘state monopoly 
capitalism’.
Variations on some classical themes
Miliband and Poulantzas both focus on 
nolitical and ideological struggles without 
reference to the economic imperatives and 
requirements of capital accumulation. This 
reflects their polemical concerns. Miliband is 
interested in confronting liberal theorists of 
democracy with the ‘facts’ about the social 
background, personal ties and shared values 
of economic and political elites, and about 
the impact, of government policy on such 
matters as the distribution of income .and 
wealth. He also argues that socialisation into 
the ideology of the ruling class is_.an 
important source of politicaL_p.cmer_and 
social order (Miliband. 1969, passim). 
Because his principal concern is to reveal the 
distortions and mystifications of liberal 
pluralism, Miliband does not advance the 
Marxist analysis of the state. Indeed, he 
actually reproduces the liberal tendency to 
discuss politics in isolation from its complex 
articulation with economic forces. To the 
extent that he does relate them it is only 
through interpersonal connections; he 
neglects their mutual presupposition and 
interdependence on the institutional level. 
Thus, M iliband does not succeed in 
establishing the real nature of the state in 
capitalist society and its inherent limitations 
£s well as advantages for capital.
Poulantzas is less concerned to disprove 
liberal democratic theory than to criticise the 
traditional Communist orthodoxy of ‘state
monopoly capitalism ’. Thus. in opposition to 
the argument, that the modern state is no 
more than a pliant tool of monopoly capital, 
he rejects all forms of instrumentalism and 
insists that, the state is a complex social 
relation The_ latter seems to mean two 
things. FirstlvYcIasses should not be seen as 
simple economic forces existing outside and
.indanondently n f l .he state and capable of 
manipulating it as a passive instrument or 
tool. For the political influence of classes and 
class— fractions—depends—in.—part on the 
institutional structure nf the state and the
effects__of state powej. Secondly
struggle is not confined to civil society, but is 
reproduced within the heart of the state 
apparatus itself. He also argues that the 
state has an objective function to perform in 
maintaining social cohesion so that capital 
accumulation can proceed unhindered 
(Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 44-50, and 1975, pp. 78- 
81 and passim). Tbus, Poulantzas criticises 
Milihand for analysing the state in terms of 
the individual human subjects who control 
it, rather than in relation to its structurally 
determined role in capitalist society 
(Poulantzas, 1969, pp. 67-78).
Unfortunately, although his criticisms of 
Miliband’s analysis and ‘state monopoly 
capitalism ’ theories are both sound, 
Poulantzas himself does not produce a 
wholly satisfactory account of the capitalist 
state. He defines the state as the factor of 
cohesion but interprets this m two 
contrasting ways. [Sometimes (he suggests 
that a sufficient condition of cohesion is the 
successful organisation of a power bloc 
under the hegemony of monopoly capital 
(Poulantzas, 1974, pp. 72-88; Cutler, 1971, pp. 
5-15). This suggestion completely ignores the 
fundamental economic constraints on the 
effective exercise of state power and implies 
that the state is an instrument of the power 
bloc rather than the monopoly sector alone^ 
E lsew here, P ou lan tzas adop ts the 
reductionist view that the effects of state 
power are necessarily circumscribed by the 
dominance of capitalism so that, in the long 
run, they can only correspond to the interests 
of the dominant class (see especially 
Poulantzas, 1969, pp. 67-78, and 1976, pp. 63- 
83). This claim implies that it is totally 
irrelevant which class controls the state 
apparatus, since it must maintain cohesion 
by virtue of its objective function. In short, 
although he is closely identified with
assertions about the relative autonomy of the 
capitalist state, Poulantzas actually 
oscillates between two extreme positions. 
Either he endows the state with complete 
independence from the economic base or he 
denies it any independence at all. Neither of 
these positions would be satisfactory on its 
own and together they render his analysis 
indeterminate.
In contrast to the political focus of 
Milihand and Poulantzas the so-called neo- 
Ricardian theorists are explicitly concerned 
with the economic dimensions of the state. 
They focus on the influence of the state on the 
distribution of income between classes, and 
attempt to show how it intervenes in the 
economy to maintain or restore corporate 
profits at the expense of wages. Such action 
by the state is generally traced back to the 
pressures on profitability that stem from 
trade union struggles and/or international 
competition. The appropriate response in 
such situations depends on the specific form 
of the profits squeeze and the balance of class 
forces. Capital will generally attempt to 
manipulate the business cycle to discipline 
labor and reduce wage costs in the interests 
of corporate profit maximisation (Boddy and 
Crotty, 1974, 1975); and/or to redistribute 
income to the private sector through fiscal 
changes, subsidies, nationalisation, 
devaluation, reflation, wage controls and 
legal restrictions on trade union activities 
(Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972); and/or to counter 
the inflationary effects of tax increases and 
public borrowing through cuts in public 
spending on the ‘social wage’ (Gough, 1975). 
In contrast, the working class will attempt to 
resist such offensive actions by capital 
(Boddy and Crotty, 1974, p. 12) and, 
hopefully, to transform the wages struggle 
and/or the opposition to the ‘cuts’ into a 
successful revolutionary movement (Glyn 
and Sutcliffe, 1972, pp. 189-216; Gough, 1975, 
pp. 91-92). But the dominant position of 
capital in the state, and especially in the field 
of economic policy-making, means that it is 
the capitalist solution to economic crises that 
is imposed (Boddy and Crotty, 1975, passim).
Such studies certainly have radical 
overtones and do relate state intervention to 
the needs of capital. But the neo-Ricardian 
approach Is still limited in its treatment of 
tbe nature of capitalism as a mode of 
production and of the class character of the 
state. For it neglects the significance of the
social relations of production and- the 
characteristic form o f capitalist exploitation 
throughJhfi_ereatixnr-and-appropriation of 
&urx25s-value. This means that it tendsT to 
treat the labor process as purely technical 
and to relate the distribution of income to the 
price of labour as determined within the 
sphere o f  c ircu la tio n . T h is  p laces 
distributional struggles at the heart of neo- 
Ricardian analyses, rather than the struggle 
at (the point of production) and this is 
reflected in the tendency to discuss state 
intervention in terms of income distribution 
and to jieglect the state’s fundamental role in 
the restructuring ot production, thus, not 
only does this kind of analysis imply that 
wage restraint and/or public spending cuts 
are sufficient to resolve crises, it also fails 
totally to confront and explain the causes, 
nature and~nmitations of Growing state 
involvemerLLinj3x.uductM>fl-i4saif. This is not 
to deny the importance of the struggle to 
determine wages (whether seen as the price 
of labor or the value of labor-power). It is to 
insist that gp_£X.clusive focus on one part of 
the circuit of capital can never _pray.ide the 
basis for underslanding—the—nature—of 
capitalist crises or state intervention.
Moreover, not only is this approach limited 
in its conception of the economy, it also has 
an impoverished view of the state. For most 
neo-Ricardian analyses treat the state 
simply as a ‘ third force ’ capable o f 
intervention, or as an instrument amenable 
to manipulation, in the interests of profit 
maximisation. In the former case there is no
"altern ptT(Texp 1 ain why the state intervenes
on behalf of capital or~why it is able,to do so
(In the latter case the analysis is plagued by 
<the usual d iff icu lt ie s  in v o lv ed  in 
(instrumentalist theories. Likewise, although 
GoughTactopts a more sophisticated analysis 
of the state and insists on its relative 
autonomy, his account is based on Miliband 
and Poulantzas and the concept of relative 
autonomy is largely rhetorical. In practice he 
combines an institutional definition of the 
state with a study of its functions in political 
struggle. This provides a neat complement to 
the technicist conception of production and 
the emphasis on distributional struggles 
found in neo-Ricardian economics. Indeed, 
Gough seems to limit political struggle to the 
incidence of taxation and the allocation of 
public spending between capital and labor. 
This means that he neglects the role of the
‘cuts’ in the restructuring of capital and the 
continuing struggle to reorganise the state 
apparatus itself to increase the political 
domination of capital. But this is a failing 
shared by the so-called neo-Ricardian 
approach more generally.
It is in connection with state intervention 
in the process of production that arguments 
based on the labor theory of value, the law of 
value, and, in particular, the law of the 
tendency of the rate o f profit to fall, have 
assumed real prominence in attempts_to 
construct a satisfactory acconnt, of the 
capitalist state. But, although they play an 
important role in Marxist analyses of capital 
accumulation, the logical and empirical 
status of these principles and laws is quite 
controversial. Indeed, as will become 
apparent as the paper proceeds, there are 
marked discrepancies in interpretation even 
among those theories that affirm their 
relevance to economic and political analysis. 
This is especially clear in the case of the law 
of the tendency of the rate ofprofittofall;the 
labor theory of value tends to be common 
ground in Marxist economics and the law of 
value generally serves as a catch-all 
principle, encapsulating the various 
tendencies and contradictions of capital 
accumulation and their mediation through 
market forces. The tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall is more controversial and is 
attacked on abstract theoretical grounds, as 
well as for its uncertain implications for the 
concrete development of capitalism. For, 
even if one accepts the validity of this so- 
called law, it is only tendential and is also 
subject to significant counter-tendencies 
(Marx, 1971, pp. 211-266; Fine and Harris,
1976, passim). It is not necessary to acceptor 
reject this particular law in the present 
context, however, since we are concerned 
only to explore the ways in which it has been 
invoked in analyses of the state in capitalist 
society.
|The laws of motion of capitalismjoccupy a 
central place in theories of ‘state monopoly 
capitalism’. These theories take different 
forms, but share certain assumptions 
concerning the periodisation of capitalism 
and the nature of its latest stage. Thus it is 
argued that the process of competition 
dyring the period of laissez-faire capitalism 
leads inevitably to the concentration and 
centralisation of capital and hence to a new 
stage in which monopolies dominate the
whole economy. Moreover, whereas the 
preceding stage of liberal competition was 
characterised by the self-regulation of 
market forces and the progressive self­
development of the forces of production, the
siag.e.__o f. m on op o ly  cap ita lism ., is
characterised by the increasing tendency of
the rate of profit to fall and thus_of
production to stagnate. To offset this 
tendency and thereby maintain the 
dynamism of capital accumulation requires 
ever-expanding state intervention in the 
economy (Afanasyev, 1974; Boccara et al.
971; Cheprakov, 1969; CPGB, 1977; 
Sdobnikov, 1971). Such intervention takes 
nany different forms. These include the 
lationalisation of basic industries, state 
provision of essential services, centralised 
control over credit and money, state 
assistance for investment, the creation of a 
arge state market for commodities, state- 
sponsored research and development at the 
?rontiers o f technology, state control of 
wages, state programming of the economy, 
md the creation o f international economic 
igencies (Afanasyev, 1974; Boccara et al., 
(1971; Nikolayev, 1975, pp. 71-92; Menshikov, 
[1975, pp. 137-183 and 265-269; Politics and 
IMoney, 1974-75). With the growth of such 
Intervention, m onopoly capitalism  is
t r a n s fo r m ed in to ‘ s ta t e .m o n o p o ly
capitalism’. This is._alle.geri-t,n he the_final 
stage of capitalism and the enormous weight 
of the state is attributed to the general crisis 
of capitalism that characterises this stage.
State intervention on this scale and with 
these effects is said to be possible because the 
state has become the Qnstrument of the 
dominant monopolies! Whereas"Marx and 
Engels saw the political executive as nothing 
but ‘a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (Marx and 
Engels, 1973, p. 69), theorists of this school 
argue that the state and the monopolies have 
‘fused’ into a single mechanism which acts 
only on behalf o f m onopoly capital 
(Afanasyev, 1974, pp. 198-200). This can be 
seen in the class background and class 
affiliations o f the personnel of the state, the 
formulation and implementation of state 
policy, and the dominance of monopoly 
capital in the educational system and mass 
media (Aaronovitch, 1956; CPGB, 1977; 
Gollan, 1956; Harvey and Hood, 1958). The 
interpenetration of the monopolies and the 
'nation-state~means that small and medium
capital are excluded from political power, as 
well as being threatened by the superior 
economic strength of big capital. This 
suggests in turn that they share certain 
interests with the proletariat in the 
overthrow of capitalism. Thus the theory of 
‘state m onopoly capitalism ’ is often 
associated with the political program of an 
anti-monopoly popular front. This would 
embrace small and medium capital as well as 
the petit-bourgeoisie and wage-earning 
class, and would attempt to capture the state 
apparatus for its own use (CPGB, 1977).
T h is app roach  is in te restin g  but 
inconsistent. For it reduces the state to an 
epiphenomenon of an economic base and 
also asserts that it is possible to use this state 
to transform that base. It derives the nature 
of the capitalist state from the immanent 
tendencies of capital accumulation and also 
endows political class struggle with the 
ability to establish socialism. Thus the 
economy is seen as self-sufficient as well as 
self-expanding in the period of liberal 
capitalism: this implies an inactive or even 
neutral state. It is seen as crisis-ridden and 
self-destructive in the neriod of monopoly 
capitalism; this implies the need for an 
interventionist state to overcome stagnation 
and maintain profits. There is little attempt 
to explain the forms o f the state and state 
intervention except in terms of the needs of 
capitalism in different situations and the 
economic domination of capital. Yet the very 
forms of intervention adopted by the 
monopolies can also be employed by popular 
forces in the transition to socialism. This is 
an instrumentalist argument that fits ill 
with the claim that the state and monopolies 
have fused into a ‘single mechanism’. Nor 
can this inconsistency be avoided by arguing 
that it re fle cts  the fu n d am en ta l 
contradiction between the constant 
expansion of the objective needs for state 
intervention in the economy and the limits 
on intervention rooted in the dominance of 
monopoly capital. For this still leaves in 
doubt the nature of the state and the nature 
of transitions from capitalist to socialist 
form ations. In short, although ‘state 
morropcnyliapitalism’ theory emphasises the 
role o f  state in terv en tion  in rhe 
reorganisation of capitalist production, it is 
associated with an inconsistent account of 
that role and its implications for political 
action.
The views considered so far involve very 
different assumptions and principles of 
explanation, but they do have on« theme in 
common. They all assume thar t|ie class 
nature of the capitalist state depends entirely 
on factors external to the state itself. Thus a 
state is capitalist for Miliband only to the 
extent that it is controlled by representatives 
and apologists for the bourgeoisie. Similar 
views occur in many neo-Ricardian and 
‘state monopoly capitalism’ studies. For 
Poulantzas it is its insertion into a social 
formation dominated by capitalism that 
guarantees its class nature. This follows 
from his functionalist view o f the state — 
since it is the cohesion of a society dominated 
by capitalism that such a state necessarily 
functions to reproduce. Finally, there is a 
related tendency in some theories to argue 
that the forms of the state are irrelevant, 
because the economy is always determinant 
in the last instance. This view emerges most 
clearly in determinist versions of ‘state 
monopoly capitalism’ theory. Thus all these 
approaches imply that the institutional 
structure of the state is irrelevant provided 
that it is manipulated by monopoly capital. 
capital in general, or a power bloc dominated 
bv capital, or. alternatively, that it is subject 
to definite economic constraints so that it 
can never become the instrument of any non- 
-^Lpilnlist fnrrp at a]] (Offo 1974, pp. 31-36). 
This means that these approaches ignore the 
view th;il. the state is a system of political 
domination, whose forms may be more or 
[ess adequate to securing the various
requirements—of... capita]__accumulation__in.
different situations,.
The state as the ideal collective 
capitalist
It is in this context that the work of certain 
Marxists in the so-called ‘capital logic’ 
school centred on the Free University of 
Berlin is particularly important. For they 
have tried to derive the general form of the 
capitalist state, as well as its principal 
functions, from the pure capitalist mode of 
production and its conditions o f existence. At 
the most general level of abstraction they 
argue that the separation of state and civil 
society characteristic of bourgeois social 
form ations stems from the nature o f 
generalised commodity production. For, not 
only is such a separation possible under 
capitalist production (because surplus labour 
is appropriated in the form of surplus-value 
realised through formally free exchange on
the market rather than through extra- 
econom ic com pulsion), but it is also 
necessary, because an institution that is not 
immediately subordinate to market forces is 
required  to p rov ide  those general 
preconditions of capital accumulation as a 
whole that are inappropriate or impossible 
for any particular competing capital to 
secure. Thus, to the extent that it is not an 
actual capitalist but a distinct political 
institution corresponding to the common 
needs of capital, the state is an ideal 
collective capitalist (Altvater, 1973, passim).
The nature of the capitalist state and state 
intervention has been variously derived in 
this school. The most abstract general 
conditions for the existence of capitalism 
whose realisation is attributed to the state 
are the legal and monetary systems 
necessary to facilitate the production and 
ex ch a n ge  o f  com m od ities  and the 
accumulation o f capital. Thus bourgeois law 
involves the creation of formally equal legal 
su b jects  w ith  a lien a b le  r igh ts  in 
commodities (including labour-power), as 
well as the development of legal apparatuses 
able to adjudicate and enforce these rights. 
The state must also establish a monetary 
system that facilitates exchange and permits 
rational economic calculation (Blanke et al.,
1974, pp. 75-96). The state is also required to 
secure the reproduction of wage labour to the 
extent that this cannot be done through 
m a rk e t fo r c e s  and  to en su re  its  
subordination to capital in the labour 
process. This requirement leads to 
intervention in areas such as factory 
legislation, supervision of union activities, 
education and social welfare (Altvater, 1973; 
Mueller and Neussuess, 1975).
The necessity for appropriate forms of law, 
money, labour-power and labour discipline is 
established through a consideration of 
capital in general, without regard to the 
existence of particular, competing capitals 
(Rosdolsky, 1974, pp. 64-67). But the capital 
logic school also looks at the problems 
involved for capital accumulation in the 
nature and effects ofcompetition. This forces 
each individual capital to realise at least the 
average rate of profit and means that the 
state will have to secure the provision of 
those use-values which are necessary to 
capital accumulation but whose private 
production proves unprofitable. This could 
involve nationalisation or some form of state
subsidy. The state must also ensure the 
supply of use-values which take the form of 
‘public goods’ and/or whose production 
involves a ‘natural monopoly’ (Altvater, 
1973). Lastly, since the total social capital is 
also divided into different national capitals, 
the state has to promote the interests of its 
particular national capital as well as to co­
operate with other states in securing the 
conditions necessary for continued capital 
accumulation on a world scale (Altvater, 
1973).
Now, although these general political and 
economic conditions are entailed in the very 
nature of capitalism as a mode of production 
(and are therefore coeval with it), there is 
clearly scope for variation in the extent and 
manner of their fulfilment. This is alleged to 
depend on the class struggle and the 
h is t o r i c a l  t e n d e n c ie s  o f  c a p i t a l  
accumulation. The tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall is especially important here, 
because it demands political intervention to 
mobilise counter-tendencies through the 
restru ctu rin g  o f ca p ita l and the 
reorganisation of the labour process. Thus it 
is not only argued that the state is essential 
to capitalism (and so cannot be neutral in the 
class struggle), but also that the amount and 
scope of its intervention tend to increase pari 
passu with the gradual unfolding of the 
process of capital accumulation (Altvater, 
1973, 1976; Yaffe, 1973).
The capital logic school qualifies this view 
of the state as an ideal collective capitalist by 
considering its continued subordination to 
the laws of motion of capitalism. It argues 
that, whilst the state intervenes more and 
more to maintain demand and reorganise 
production, it cannot transcend market 
forces nor eliminate the tendential fall in the 
rate of profit. At best it can modify the forms 
in which these forces manifest themselves 
and mobilise counter-tendencies to declining 
profitability. The power of the capitalist 
state in this respect is necessarily limited, 
because it cannot directly determine the 
decision-making of private capital. For state 
intervention is always mediated through the 
monetary and legal conditions affecting the 
operation o f market forces and the 
organisation of production in the private 
sector. Within these limits, however, private 
capital is free to determine its economic 
conduct (Blanke et al., 1977, pp. 92-96). This 
constraint is reinforced by the contradictions
inherent in capital accumulation. Two cases 
often cited in this literature concern 
employment policy and state-sponsored 
industrial reorganisation. Thus Keynesian- 
style intervention to maintain full 
employment demand is said to be at the 
expense of accelerating inflation. This 
means that such policies must sooner or later 
be abandoned and the result will be an acute 
depression and mass unemployment. If the 
state is to escape this dilemma, it must 
replace the purgative function of economic 
crises with state-sponsored capital 
reconstruction. But such policies also involve 
definite costs. Forthey require the expansion 
of state expenditure, involve the expulsion of 
labour from commodity production, produce 
a ‘fiscal crisis of the state’ , lead to the general 
politicisation of economic class struggle, and 
so forth (Altvater, 1973; Bullock and Jaffe, 
1973). It would therefore seem that the 
capitalist state is trapped within the 
capitalist mode of production and cannot 
escape from its contradictions and crises.
The arguments of this particular school 
represented a fundamental theoretical 
advance, through their demonstration that 
the state cannot be conceived as a mere 
political instrument set up and controlled by 
capital. For its proponents establish that the 
capitalist state is an essential element in the 
social reproduction of capital — a political 
force that complements the economic force of 
competition between individual capitals and 
assures the immanent necessities that 
cannot be secured through the latter. This 
requires, among other things, that the state 
intervene against capital as well as the 
working class — especially when individual 
capitals or fractions of capital threaten the 
interests of capital in general. Such action 
illustrates the error of viewing the state as a 
simple instrument of capital. These studies 
also claim to reveal the fallacies of the 
reformist argument that the state can be 
used to overcome the basic contradictions of 
the capitalist system and, indeed, to effect a 
gradual, peaceful transition to socialism 
through the skilled manipulation of the 
existing state apparatus. Forthey argue that 
the state, precisely because it is an essential 
element (albeit relatively autonomous) in the 
total process of capital accumulation, 
necessarily reflects and reproduces these 
ba s ic  co n tra d ic t io n s  w ith ou t ever 
eliminating them.
There are also serious difficulties with this 
analysis, however, which are deeply rooted 
in the basic approach. For, in trying to derive 
the nature of the capitalist state from that of 
the capitalist mode of production in its pure 
form, the ‘capital logicians’ commit the 
reductionist fallacy identified above in a 
more complex form. Whereas simple 
reductionism treats the political as a mere 
epiphenomenon o f an economic base and 
denies it any reciprocal influence on the base, 
this approach postulates the necessity of a 
political level whose form and effects are 
determined at the econom ic level. It 
demonstrates that an ‘ideal collective 
capitalist’ can be constituted theoretically to 
assure certain general conditions without 
which capitalism would be impossible; and 
that this presupposes in turn a particular 
form of separation between the political and 
economic aspects of accumulation. But all 
that this establishes is that capitalism is a 
possible mode of production and that it 
involves a specific form of state. As long as 
the ‘capital logicians’ remain within this 
framework, they cannot account for the 
origins of the capitalist state nor explain how 
it can function as if it were an ideal collective 
capitalist. In both cases they resort to the 
unsatisfactory argument that everything 
that happens in a capitalist society 
necessarily corresponds to the needs of 
capital accumulation. Moreover, even when 
this complex form of reductionism is 
apparently avoided, through ad hoc 
references to crises and class struggles as the 
motor force behind state intervention, these 
are still considered in purely economic terms 
and it is assumed that the interests of capital 
are always realised in the final analysis (see 
especially Mueller and Neusuess, 1975). More 
recently it has been conceded that the 
‘capital logic’ approach can only indicate the 
probable forms of the state, and specify the 
broad limits within which variations can 
occur without fundamentally threatening 
the process of capital accumulation. But the 
difficulty remains that the ‘needs of capital’ 
s t ill  p rov ide  the on ly  p r in c ip le  o f  
explanation, rather than becoming the point 
of reference for a more developed theory. 
There is little or no attempt to account for the 
circumstances in which these needs are met. 
Thus, despite various efforts to introduce 
class struggles and non-economic variables, 
it remains true that this school reduces 
history to an effect of the logical self­
realisation of capital (Gerstenberger, 1976A, 
B; Laclau, 1977, pp. 7-12).
The attempt to introduce historical 
specificity and class struggle
It is in response to some of these difficulties 
with the ‘capital logic’ approach that a more 
recent school of Marxists, centred this time 
at Frankfurt (but not to be confused with the 
Frankfurt school of ‘critical social science’), 
has attempted to introduce a greater degree 
of historical specificity and a sharper 
awareness of the role of class struggle into 
the study o f the capitalist state. Thus, 
although they accept the basic arguments 
concerning the need for a separate political 
institution to secure certain preconditions of 
capitalism, they reject an emphasis on the 
needs of competing capitals considered in 
isolation from their antagonistic relation 
with wage-labour. They insist that the 
capitalist state can be understood only in 
terms of its changing functions in the class 
struggle over the organisation of the labour 
process and the appropriation of surplus- 
value. F urtherm ore, becau se they 
concentrate on the historical development of 
this struggle rather than the logical 
implications of competing capitals, they are 
better able to analyse the contradictions 
involved in state intervention (von 
Braunmuhl et al., 1973; Gerstenberger, 1975; 
Hirsch, 1977; Holloway and Picciotto, 1977).
This approach can be illustrated through 
its analysis of the general development of the 
modern interventionist state from its origins 
in the feudal absolutist state in Europe. In 
this context the first struggles concern the 
expansion of international trade and the 
creation of a wage-labouring class. Once the 
primitive accumulation of capital and a 
labour force have been secured through 
mercantilism and related domestic policies, 
the capitalist state must adopt a laissez-faire 
role to assure the maximum scope for capital 
accumulation. But it must still intervene to 
regulate the self-destructive tendencies of 
ruthless competition and guarantee the 
g e n e r a l  c o n d i t io n s  n e c e s s a r y  to 
accumulation through, for example, factory 
legislation and control over credit. Moreover, 
as the process o f capital accumulation 
continues, the socialisation of production 
and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
require increasing intervention to mobilise 
c o u n te r - t e n d e n c ie s  th ro u g h  the
restructuring of capital, the reimposition of 
capitalist control over the labour process, 
and the reassertion of bourgeois hegemony 
o v e r  t h e  w o r k i n g  c l a s s .  T h e  
internationalisation of capital poses new 
problems and requires new forms of state 
apparatus and state intervention, to secure 
the continued reorganisation of social 
relations in favour o f capital accumulation 
on a world scale (Gerstenberger, 1976A; 
Holloway and Picciotto, 1977).
As the appropriate forms of intervention 
change with the progress o f capital 
accumulation, so do the appropriate forms of 
representation and legislation. Thus, in the 
context of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, the most adequateform of state is 
said to be a royal absolutism implementing 
mercantilist policies. During the period of 
liberal capitalism, however, this changes to a 
bourgeois parliamentary democracy. For the 
latter provides a forum for the representation 
of the different fractions of the ruling class 
and for the passage of laws that subject all 
capitals equally to the same general rules 
supervised through a bureaucracy of state 
officials. The transition from absolutism to 
parliamentarism and, within the latter 
context, the extension o f the franchise to 
dominated classes, both entail sustained 
class struggles. Finally, in the period of 
monopoly capitalism, the form of state must 
change again. The state must now enter into 
direct relations with individual capitals and 
increase the strength and scope of its means 
of intervention in order to mobilise counter­
tendencies to the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. This requires a transition, from 
general legislation enacted and enforced 
according to the rule of law to new and more 
pow erfu l form s o f  d iscr im in a tory  
intervention at the discretion of the state 
bureaucracy. This change is reflected in the 
declining role of parliament as major 
capitalist interests seek direct access to the 
executive and administration; and in the 
continual reproduction o f the conflicts 
between capitals within the heart of the 
bureaucracy itself. In short, as accumulation 
proceeds, there is a growing tendency for the 
capitalist state to be transformed into a 
strong state characterised by a weak 
parliament, a powerful bureaucracy and 
marked participation by individual capitals 
and social democratic trade unions 
(Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, pp. 85-97:
Mandel, 1975, pp. 474-499; Picciotto, 1977, 
passim).
This approach not only introduces some 
historical specificity into the analysis of the 
capitalist state, it also develops some 
significant ideas about the nature and effects 
of class struggle. There are four main 
contributions in this respect. Firstly, it is 
argued that capital accum ulation is 
conditional on the continued ability of 
capital itself to secure through struggle the 
many different conditions necessary for the 
creation and appropriation of surplus-value 
on an ever-expanding scale. This means, 
among other things, that the laws of motion 
of capitalism are not natural and inevitable, 
but actually depend for their realisation on 
the balance of forces in the unceasing 
struggle between capital and labour. Crises 
are therefore seen as the effect of failure to 
maintain the domination of capital over 
labour, rather than as the result of the 
inexorable logic of accumulation. Secondly, 
it is argued that capital accumulation is an 
unplanned and anarchic process that takes 
place behind the backs o f economic agents. 
Thus, capitalism and its operation are 
generally seen in more or less distorted, 
fetishised guise. This means that state 
intervention is rarely directed towards the 
actual needs of capital and generally reflects 
a response to the political repercussions of 
accumulation. Thirdly, because there is no 
necessary correspondence between state 
intervention and the needs of capital, crises 
play a major role in reshaping its form and 
redirecting its thrust. For it is during crises 
that the immanent necessities of capitalism 
are most likely to become apparent. In this 
sense it can be said that crises act as the 
steering mechanism of state intervention. 
Fourthly, since crises are the complex effect 
of various contradictory factors and affect 
different classes in contradictory ways, there 
will be continuing conflict over their 
interpretation and resolution. This means 
that crisis-management will assume the 
form of trial-and-error responses, whose 
content is determined by the changing 
balance of political forces. Moreover, since 
capitalism is necessarily beset with 
contradictions, no economic strategy can 
overcome those barriers to accumulation 
inherent in capitalism itself (Gerstenberger, 
1973; Hirsch, 1976; Holloway and Picciotto, 
1976; Lindner, 1973; Wirth, 1976).
The recent work of Claus Offe should also 
be mentioned here. For, although he starts 
from different assumptions, Offe has 
reached similar conclusions on several of 
these issues. He argues that the capitalist 
state has four main structural features. 
Firstly, it is excluded from the organisation 
of capitalist production and the allocation of 
private capital. Thus it can affect 
accumulation only indirectly. Secondly, 
because the state is separated from capitalist 
production, its survival and performance 
clearly depend on revenues that originate 
outside its immediate control. Thirdly, since 
capitalism is neither self-regulating nor self- 
sufficient, the state has a mandate to create 
and sustain those conditions necessary to 
accumulation. And, fourthly, faced with this 
precarious combination of exclusion and 
dependence, the state can function on behalf 
of capital only if it can equate the needs of 
capital with the national interest and secure 
popular support for measures that maintain 
the conditions for accumulation while 
respecting its private character (Offe, 1975, 
passim; Offe and Ronge, 1975).
Offe goes on to argue that the political 
mechanisms required to reproduce these 
conditions change with the nature of 
capitalism. In particular, as the capitalist 
state is increasingly forced to secure the 
provision of specific inputs that individual 
capitals cannot produce profitably as well as 
to provide the general social conditions 
required for accumulation, it is necessary to 
establish ‘planning ’ and encourage 
‘participation’ as well as to centralise the 
existing administrative system. But all three 
mechanisms must prove inadequate to the 
tasks o f capitalist reproduction. For 
bureaucratic administration is alleged to be 
inefficient in the organisation of social and 
economic programmes, as opposed to the 
routine implementation of specific policies 
according to predetermined rules. Planning 
is ineffective because it is opposed by private 
capitals whenever it threatens their 
individual interests. And participation 
intensifies the class struggle within the state 
apparatus and so threatens to disrupt the 
balance of forces required to implement 
capitalist policies. Offe therefore concludes 
that there will be perpetual oscillation 
between these different mechanisms as the 
state continually comes up against their 
different limitations (Offe, 1975).
Because it is premised in part on an 
internal critique of the ‘capital logic’ 
approach, this school has been able to 
develop concepts and principles o f 
explanation that preserve its theoretical 
advances and resolve some of its theoretical 
inadequacies. Above all, it seeks to establish 
that not only is there no guarantee that the 
capitalist state can secure all the needs of 
capital at one time, but it is actually 
impossible for it to do so. However, it is its 
very emphasis on historical specificity and 
class struggle that reveals the limitations of 
this approach. For it lacks certain essential 
concepts for historical analysis and operates 
with an unduly restricted view of class 
struggle. Capitalist relations of production 
exist only in specific variant forms and in 
combination with other forms of social and 
private labour. This means that class 
struggles are influenced by other classes and 
social forces than capital and wage-labour. 
Moreover, since each particular economic 
formation has its own distinctive political 
and ideological relations and conditions of 
existence, such struggles will also be shaped 
by the different ways in which economic 
classes are inserted into the superstructure. 
The problems involved in periodising class 
struggle are particularly clear in transitional 
periods, but they are always present in 
historical analyses of the capitalist state. 
Thus no amount of abstract analysis of 
capitalism, or, indeed, its variant forms, 
would enable one to determine the changing 
relations between the feudal nobility and 
bourgeoisie in the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism. Nor would it enable one to 
determine the political role of the petit 
bourgeoisie in the class struggle between 
monopoly capital and wage-labour in 
Weimar Germany. Nor again would it help to 
assess the effects of religious ideology in 
Northern Ireland. Yet these problems are 
critical in understanding the nature of state 
power in particular societies and its effects 
on capital accumulation.
The capitalist state and popular- 
democratic struggle
It is here that the work of Gramsci and the 
‘neo-Gramscian’ school is most relevant. For 
these theorists have investigated the 
problem o f political and ideological 
hegemony and elaborated a number of
concepts and assumptions that have greatly 
advanced the analysis of class struggles. 
However, because this school tends to adopt 
a ‘class theoretical’ rather than a ‘capital 
theoretical’ approach, its analyses 
frequently underestimate or totally ignore 
the constraints on the state entailed in the 
nature o f capitalism and also overestimate 
the autonomy of politics and ideology. Thus, 
i f  the arguments o f the two ‘capital 
theoretical’ schools need to be supplemented 
with analyses of political and ideological 
domination, the neo-Gramscian approach 
must be modified in the light of the economic 
limitations on state power and ideological 
hegemony.
Theorists of this persuasion stress that the 
capitalist state is not a simple instrument 
manipulated by a unitary bourgeois class. 
They argue instead that the state plays a 
vital role in unifying the bourgeoisie and 
organising its political and ideological 
domination. For, in opposition to the 
widespread Marxist view that each class has 
an essential unity of purpose based on its 
members’ shared position in the economic 
system, the neo-Gramscian school insists 
that its unity depends on the existence of 
particular forms o f organisation and 
representation. The most important problem
in securing_the conditions for capital
accumulation is therefore located at the level 
o f c lass practices . It concerns the 
organisation of the dominant class and the 
disorganisation of the dominated class. This 
is considered necessary because competition 
among capitals threatens the unity of the 
bourgeois class at the same time as its 
involvement in struggle threatens to unify 
the working class (Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 188- 
189 and 256-257). The solution to this 
problem is found in the nature of ideological 
hegemony and/or the form of the state.
Ideological hegemony is discussed in 
terms o f  the intellectual and moral 
leadership of the popular classes by the 
dominant classes or power bloc (Gramsci, 
1971, pp. 52-89,104-113,130-132, 275-276 and 
passim', Laclau, 1977, pp. 94-111; Poulantzas, 
1973, pp. 130-141, 206-224 and 239-245; 
Poulantzas, 1976, pp. 134-162). In this 
context, a power bloc is a fairly stable 
alliance of dominant classes or class 
fractions, whose unity depends on a 
modicum o f mutual self-sacrifice o f
im m ediate in terests  and on their 
commitment to a common world outlook. 
Examples would include the British 
‘establishment’ and the Unionist bloc in 
Northern Ireland. For hegemony to exist, 
then, it is necessary for the dominant bloc to 
secure the support o f dominated classes 
(such as the peasantry, the urban petit 
bourgeoisie and sections of the working 
class), of social categories (such as the 
military, officials and intellectuals), and of 
significant social forces (such as ethnic 
minorities, religious movements, and 
similar groups capable of intervening with 
pertinent effects on the class struggle 
between capital and wage-labour). Such 
support does not stem from simple ‘false 
consciousness’ , but is rooted in the 
incorporation o f certain interests and 
aspirations of the ‘people’ into the dominant 
ideology. For the ability of the power bloc to 
maintain its hegemony depends on its 
success in articulating ‘popular-democratic’ 
struggles into an ideology that sustains the 
power of the dominant classes and fractions. 
rather than working to reinforce the 
revolutionary movement. Conversely, if the 
working class is to establish its counter­
hegemony over the people and so isolate the 
power bloc, it is essential for it to integrate 
‘popular-democratic’ struggles into a mass 
movement led by a political party that is 
organically linked to the people (Laclau,
1977, pp. 94-111).
This school also considers the effects of 
particular forms of state on the degree of 
bourgeois domination. Thus, Poulantzas 
suggests that the coupling of individual 
citizenship as a legal institution with the 
nation-state as a juridical subject is 
particularly effective here. For, not only does 
the constitution of all members of society as 
political subjects endowed with equal rights, 
regardless of their class affiliation, 
complement their formal equality as 
economic agents, it also encourages their 
atomisation and individuation and disguises 
the substantive inequalities in political rule. 
In this sense the commodity fetishism, 
engendered by exchange relations, is 
mirrored in liberal political and legal 
institutions. Conversely, not only does the 
emergence of a nation-state correspond to the 
need for an ‘ideal collective capitalist’ , it also 
implies the existence of a national or popular 
interest that reflects the common interests of
all its citizens regardless of their class 
membership. This is alleged to sustain the 
belief in a neutral state able to reconcile class 
antagonisms and thus to facilitate the rule of 
capital (Poulantzas, 1973, passim).
Bourgeois political domination is also said 
to be reinforced by free elections and strong 
parliamentary institutions. For it seems that 
electoral competition encourages the power 
bloc to take account of  the interests of the 
dominated classes when formulating its
provides the basis for welfare state 
programmes and other social policies 
concerned with working-class and popular- 
democratic demands. It also limits the 
electoral prospects of any parties that are 
openly committed to class struggle and 
revolution, as they will appear sectional and 
undemocratic. At the same time free 
elections also provide the means to change 
government policies and ruling parties in 
response to shifts in the balance of class 
forces, without threatening the smooth 
operation of the state apparatus as a whole. 
It is also noted that, within this institutional 
context, parliaments provide an important 
forum for different capitalist and non­
capitalist interests to hammer out common 
policies in conditions where failure to do so 
will impair or paralyse effective government. 
Thus, whereas so-called ‘exceptional’ forms 
o f capitalist state (such as military 
dictatorship and fascism) may seem strong 
because they are dictatorial or totalitarian in 
nature, they are inadequate to the tasks of 
political rule in capitalist societies. For their 
apparent strength hides a brittleness of 
institutional structure which means that 
they are unable to respond effectively to the 
changing crises, conflicts and contradictions 
inherent in these societies. In contrast, since 
universal suffrage, competing parties, the 
separation of powers and parliamentary 
government ensure a measure of flexibility, 
the power bloc in a democratic system is able 
to maintain social cohesion and so secure the 
conditions necessary for continued capital 
accumulation (Gamble, 1974, pp. 3-10; 
Jessop, 1977, passim ; Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 
277-307; Poulantzas, 1976, pp. 90-97 and 
passim).
Now, if such arguments are accepted, one 
must ask why capitalism is ever associated 
with non-democratic forms of state. The 
solution to this problem is not hard to find.
For the neo-Gramscian school stresses that 
the rule of capital is not unconditional but 
depends on the ever-changing balance of 
class forces. The strength of capital appears 
in its ability to take advantage of economic 
crises in order to reorganise production and 
increase capital accumulation (Debrav, 1973, 
pp. 141-142; Poulantzas, 1973, p. 171n). This 
depends in turn on its continued political and 
ideological domination (Nun. 1967, p. 99 and 
passim). However, despite the apparent 
institutional separation of the economic, 
political and ideological levels in capitalist 
societies, they are closely related. Thus 
e co n om ic crises n ecessa rily  have 
repercussions on the other levels (and vice 
versa) so that a restructuring of the state as a 
system of political domination may be a 
precondition of solving an economic crisis. It 
is in this context that concepts such as crises 
of political representation and ideological 
hegemony are particularly relevant. For 
these signify the dissociation of political 
struggle from the established organs of 
representation and the dissolution of 
hegemony, resulting in the detachment of 
the masses from bourgeois political and 
ideological leadership (Poulantzas, 1974, pp. 
62-65, 71-78 and passim). In such situations, 
the bourgeois democratic republic may prove 
inadequate to securing the conditions 
necessary for accumulation. Whether it is 
regenerated or replaced by another form of 
state depends on the strategies adopted by 
different political forces and their relative 
strengths. But there can be no guarantee that 
new forms of domination will prove more 
adequate to securing such conditions or, in 
revolutionary situations, the conditions for a 
successful transition to a different form of 
society.
It is the merit of the neo-Gramscian school 
to have developed certain concepts for the 
analysis of specific capitalist societies and 
not just of capitalism considered as a pure 
mode of production. But its analyses are 
often vitiated by a systematic neglect of the 
economic constraints rooted in the nature of 
capital accumulation. For, though it is well 
aware of the various forms of class struggle 
and popular-democratic struggle, it is not as 
concerned with the general laws of capitalist 
production. This results in a certain 
unevenness and asymmetry in the work of 
the school and points to the need to integrate 
the different approaches.
Concluding remarks
This review has tried to locate the position 
of the state in Marxist discourse and to 
assess the adequacy o f various theoretical 
approaches to its study in capitalist societies. 
Marxist theories are heterogeneous in 
approach, but are unified through a common 
concern with specific modes of production, 
their conditions of existence and their effects 
on social formations. They are not concerned 
to develop a theory of the mode of production 
‘in general’ nor, a fortiori, a theory of the 
state (or society) ‘in general’ . It is also 
debatable whether it is possible to develop a 
theory of the capitalist state in general. For, 
since capitalism exists neither in pure form 
nor in isolation, states in capitalist societies 
will necessarily differ from one another.
It is in this context that we can best 
appreciate the above studies. For their 
overall effect has been to redefine the 
problem of the state in capitalist society in a 
way that makes theoretical and political 
progress possible once more. They have 
dissolved the orthodox approaches in terms 
of the state as a thing or a subject that is 
external to the capitalist mode of production. 
In their place, they have focused attention on 
the social nature of capitalist production and 
its com plex econom ic, political and 
ideological preconditions. This means that 
the state and state power must assume a 
central role in capital accumulation, even in 
those apparently counterfactual cases 
characterised by a neutral, laissez-faire 
state, as well as those where the state is 
massively involved in the organisation of 
production. Moreover, because the state is 
seen as a complex institutional system and 
the influence o f classes is seen to depend on 
their forms o f organisation, alliances, etc., it 
is also necessary to reject a crude 
instrumentalist approach. It is no longer a 
question of how pre-existing classes use the 
state (or the state itself acts) in defence of 
capitalism defined at an economic level. 
Henceforth it is a question of the adequacy of 
state power as a necessary element in the 
overall reproduction of the capital relation in 
different societies and situations. And state 
power in turn must be considered as a 
complex, contradictory effect o f class (and 
popular-democratic) struggles, mediated 
through and conditioned by the institutional 
system of the state. In short, the effect of 
these studies is to reinstate and elaborate the
idea that the state is a system of political 
domination.
But the interest of these studies is not 
restricted to the field of Marxist theory and 
politics. For the problems with which they 
have been grappling occur in similar forms 
in non-Marxist economic and political 
enquiries. It is not specific points of economic 
analysis that are at issue here, but the 
adequacy of certain common assumptions 
concerning the nature of the state, its role in 
economic activity, and the relevance of 
orthodox economic theories in the light of 
that role. Either the nature of the state is seen 
as irrelevant to economic theory as such and 
regarded as a factor that shapes and limits 
the application of economic principles in 
given conditions. Or, it being recognised that 
its exclusion from economic theory is 
arbitrary and unjustifiable, the state is all 
too often treated simply as a subject 
comparable to a firm or household, or as a set 
of neutral policy instruments applicable to 
various economic goals, or as the private 
property of rational, maximising, self- 
interested political actors. The precise 
implications of these latter approaches 
depend on the other assumptions with which 
they are combined. Thus in its theoretical 
guise as a subject the state may be seen as a 
legal sovereign that controls economic 
activity, as a referee or umpire that intervenes 
in economic disputes, as one economic agent 
among others, or as a political agent whose 
actions may promote or hinder economic 
performance. The instruments-goals 
approach is generally associated with 
technical disputes over the appropriate 
forms and direction of intervention and with 
political disputes about the role of the state in 
the allocation and redistribution o f 
resources. And the model of ‘homo politicus’ 
tends to be linked with claims that the self- 
interest of state personnel is inimical to 
economic growth. Now, although these 
approaches illuminate certain aspects of the 
state, they do not advance political economy 
in any fundamental way. For they deal at 
best with the surface phenomena of politics 
and have no theoretical means to explore the 
deeper connections between the state and 
economic development.
It is here that the recent Marxist debate 
has major im plications for orthodox 
economics. For it establishes that capitalism 
is a specific mode of the social organisation
of production and has definite historical 
preconditions and forms of development. It 
also establishes that the state has an 
essential role in securing these preconditions 
and that its institutional structure and forms 
of intervention must be transformed as 
capitalism changes and develops. The recent 
discussion further argues that the economic 
state apparatuses and their means of 
intervention are not neutral, but are 
integrated into the movement o f capital and 
constitute a field of conflict between different 
interests. This means that state intervention 
has inherent limitations in securing the 
conditions for capital accumulation and is 
always subject to the inevitable influence of 
various class and popular-democratic 
struggles. It also means that the adequacy of 
particular policy instruments and general 
forms of intervention will vary not only with 
changes in economic structure but also with 
changes in the balance of political forces. 
Related to these arguments is the further 
po in t that the form s o f  p o lit ica l 
representation also have distinct effects on 
the e ff ica cy  o f  d iffe ren t form s o f  
intervention. This in turn implies that the 
failure of specific policy measures or general 
instruments may be due to the inadequacy of 
the forms of political representation with 
which they are linked, rather than to
mistaken economic analysis. It means as 
well that the reorganisation of the state 
apparatus mav be necessary before economic 
problems or crises can he resolved. The 
current debate about industrial democracy. 
the ‘social contract’ and the development o f
tripartite or corporatist institutions__La.
particularly germane here.
In short, the overall thrust of these studies 
is to suggest that the analysis of the state is 
not an activity irrelevant or marginal to 
economic theory. It is not something that can 
he consigned safely to another discipline 
within an intellectual division of labour, or to 
a future date in the development o f 
economics itself. It is rather an absolute 
p recon d ition  o f  adequate econ om ic  
theorising today. Economics must therefore 
take up the challenge of the continuing 
Marxist debate and counterpose its own 
solutions, if any, to the problems with which 
the latter deals. It is high time that orthodox 
economics renewed its traditional role as the 
science of political economy. Failure to do so 
will surely be tantamount to a self­
declaration of theoretical poverty in a 
fundamental area of economic analysis and 
a primary concern of political practice.
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